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CASE COMMENTS

did not give any indication as to whether the decision will be
applied to non-tax cases where the decision of a lower state court
is involved.' Conceiveably the principles enunciated in Bosch
could be applied to non-tax federal cases as well as tax cases.
Patrick David Deem

Evidence-Expert Testimony-Quantity and Quality

Required to Establish Causal Relation
P's decedent was injured in an automobile accident when he
was thrown violently against his seat belt placing sudden, severe
pressure on his abdominal and pelvic organs, and allegedly resulting in the aggravation and acceleration of a pre-existing cancer of
the left testicle. The cancer subsequently spread through decendent's body, and he died some nine months later. There was a
jury vedict for P in her action charging D with negligence. Held,
affirmed. Expert medical testimony, standing alone, stating there
is a possibility of a casual relationship between a given accident
and subsequent death is not sufficient. However, when such expert
testimony is combined with uncontradicted non-expert evidence as
to the decedent's general good health prior to the accident, including evidence that he had had no prior difficulties with his
testicles, prostate, urinary tract, or kidneys, the evidence is sufficient to establish a causal relationship. National Dairy Products
Corporationv. Durham, 154 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 1967).
Courts vary considerably on what quantity and quality of expert
testimony are necessary to establish a causal relationship. Although
most courts accept probability as sufficient, some jurisdictions take
the more lenient Georgia view and permit evidence of possible
connection along with other evidence to satisfy the requirement.
The dissent in the principal case stressed the need of probability.
Contending that the causal connection upheld by the majority was
too speculative and conjectural to support a recovery, the dissent
reasoned that use of the words "if," "possibility" and "might" by
21 See Torres v. Gardner, 270 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R. 1967) where in vacating
the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the court
held that the determination by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico that children
were the sole and universal heirs of the wage earner was res judicata on the
administrative agency.
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the expert witnesses gave the jury no factual basis on which to
establish a causal relationship between the injury and the death.
The dissent concluded that until the medical profession can elevate
its knowledge of cancer to the realm of probability, recovery in
such cases must be denied.' Many courts require this probability
but no one standard of what constitutes probability has ever been
established. Thus the courts have held the following to satisfy the
requirements of probability: a doctor's uncontradicted opinion
that he thought plaintiff's accident hastened her death by lowering
her resistance to the degree that an eight-year-old inoperable
malignancy spread rapidly through her body;2 a doctor's testimony
that plaintiff's waitress work "probably" aggravated a pre-existing
condition, even though the same result might "possibly" have occurred at a later date, had she never been so employed;3 an expert's use of the word possible when it is reasonably apparent he
intends probability;4 an expert's statement that in his opinion the
result did arise from the alleged cause, anything less, including
"probably did," not being sufficient;' an expert's opinion that the
result in question may "probably follow," or is 'likely, liable or apt to
follow" the injury.6
The proposition is generally accepted that expert testimony,
standing alone, stating there is a possibility of causal relationship
is not sufficient to establish such a causal relationship.! Some
courts however take the position that such evidence of possibility
when coupled with other evidence is sufficient to take the question
of causation to the jury. Generally, the other evidence considered
acceptable is a convincing factual sequence of events. Thus
appellate courts have upheld plaintiff verdicts based on expert
testimony of a possibility and proof of the following: evidence of an
infant's prior good health, his parents' close watch over his activities, and his freedom from any other accident;8 evidence of good
' National Dairy Products Corp. v. Durham, 154 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App.
1967) (dissentin opinion).
2 Abel v. Yoken, 104 N.H. 119, 179 A.2d 456, 458 (1962).
' Walter v. Hagianis, 97 N.H. 314, 316-317, 87 A.2d 154, 156-157 (1952).
4 Miller v. Nat'l Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 282, 168 N.E.2d 811, 813,
204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1960).
5 Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 501, 103 A.2d
681, 6684 (1954).
Wigton Motor Co. v. Phillips, 163 Okla. 160, 164, 21 P.2d 751, 754
(1933).
7

3 AM. Jut. Proof of Facts § 127 (1959).
Hamlin v. N.H. Bragg & Sons, 129 Me. 165, 167, 151 A. 197, 199
(1933).
8
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health before the accident and continual doctor's care from then
until death;9 evidence of a pre-existing cancer, an accidental violent
blow to the body exactly where the cancer was located, and immediate symptoms of disability; 0 evidence of good health, an
injury, and subsequent death from cancer which caused one
court to explain that the lay mind can reach no other conclusion
than the accident either caused or aggravated cancer;" evidence of
the plaintiff having curvature of the spine after the accident, but
not before;' 2 evidence of facts seeming to show that an accident
caused the condition."3 Many of these possibility-plus cases considered it a strong point in plaintiffs favor if no causation other than
the one he alleged was offered in evidence."
As may be seen by the varied conclusions on what constitutes
probability or satisfies possibility-plus, the courts have had great
difficulty in defining their requirements. Perhaps the ultimate in
this type of difficulty may be found in the expression of one court
that proof of "possible" cause and effect, combined with a factual
sequence of events, may be equivalent to "probable cause."'"
Recognizing the difficulty in following either of these approaches,
the New York court has made definite attempts to clarify and limit
the quantity and quality of proof necessary to establish a causal relation. One opinion stated that in order to recover for the aggravation of a pre-existing cancer (as in the principal case), there
must be a direct blow to the site of the cancer or a spreading of the
disease into other areas of the body.' 6 A later opinion, after review9Smith v. Primrose Tapestry Co., 285 Pa. 145, 148, 131 A. 703, 704
(1926).
,°Lucas v. Haas Coal Co., 118 Pa. Super. 182, 186, 179 A. 876, 878
(1935).

11Winchester Milling Corp. v. Sencindiver, 148 Va. 388, 395, 138 S.E.
479,481 (1927).
12 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Kelly, 194 Okla. 646, 648, 153 P.2d

1010, 1012 (1944).
13 Bethlebem-Sparrows Point Shipyard Inc. v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375,
380, 50 A.2d 256, 259 (1946).
14Hamlin v. N.H. Bragg & Sons, 129 Me. 165, 167, 151 A. 197, 199
(1933); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Kelly, 194 Okla. 646, 648, 153 P.2d

1010, 1012 (1944). In refusing to follow this type of reasoning the New York

court argued that such a policy takes the burden from the plaintiff of proving
causation and places it on the other party to show that some other cause was
responsible. As the court concluded, "The law does not intend that the less
that is known about a disease the greater shall be the opportunity of recovery.
. . . Miller v. Natl Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 289, 168 N.E.2d 811, 818,

204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 138 (1960).

15 Charlton Bros. Transp. Co. v. Garrettson, 188 Md. 85, 94, 51 A.2d

642, 646 (1947).
16

Sikora v. Apex Beverage Corp., 282 App. Div. 193, 122 N.Y.S.2d 64,

67 (1953).
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ing many decisions, concluded that recovery in these cases is only
allowed when the trauma occurred at the exact location of the cancer and the symptoms of aggravation were immediate."7
Although the early West Virginia cases held that the probability
requirement must be met, it seems now that this state follows the
possibility-plus doctrine. In Foose v. Hawley Corporation,'" the
West Virginia court, considering the problem of an alleged
causal relation between an elevator accident and plaintiff's subsequent hernia, upheld a verdict for plaintiff. Plaintiff produced
two medical witnesses. The first, who had personally examined him,
stated that "it probably in all probability was the exciting cause."
The second witness, in response to a hypothetical question, said, "I
think it is quite possible ....I think it is very probably the cause." 9
Holding these opinions to be competent evidence, the court concluded that they served to establish "probable cause."2" Comparing
the expert testimony quoted in Foose to that offered in Hayzlett v.
2 where a physician
Westvaco Chlorine Products Corporation,
testified that inhalation of gas "might" cause a heart attack, the
court reasoned that "might" indicates only possibility, while the
testimony in Foose related a probability. The court added that the
testimony was admissible in evidence, but was not alone sufficient to
establish a causal relationship" which could be submitted to the
jury, and therefore the directed verdict for the defendant was reinstated. 3 In Rutherford v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,24
an instruction to the jury to disregard testimony of an expert witness
as "too speculative" was made when the expert said, "I think
it is possible, yes." " The court stated that such testimony was
standing alone, was not sufficient to establish a
admissible, but,
causal relation.2
17 Miller v. Nat'l Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 285, 168 N.E.2d 811, 815,
204 N.Y.S.2d 129., 135 (1960). A third decision, while admittedly not resolving the medical debate on whether trauma can cause cancer, held that two
Sostulates must be met before a connection can be established: the cancer must
orm exactly at the site of the injury, and enough time must have elapsed for
it to bave reached a diagnostic size. Without setting an exact time limit, the
court felt two months failed this test. Dennison v. Wing, 279 App. Div. 494,
110 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (1952).
.120 W. Va. 334, 198 S.E. 138 (1938).
219
0 Id. at 336, 198 S.E. at 139.
Id.at 337, 198 S.E. at 139.
21 125 W. Va. 611, 25 S.E.2d 759 (1943).
22 Id. at 617, 25 S.E.2d at 762 (dictum).
23 Id. at 619, 25 S.E.2d at 762.
24 142 W. Va. 681, 97 S.E.2d 803 (1957).
25
Id.at 683, 97 S.E.2d at 805.
26
Id.at 692, 97 S.E.2d at 809 (dictum).
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From the dicta in these earlier opinions, the court seemed to
make the logical extension to possibility-plus beginning with State
v. Evans.' There the Foose case was cited for the proposition
that an expert could be asked whether a result was actually
caused or "might" be caused by a given injury and that such a form
of examination was not speculative.2" Judge Haymond in his
dissent called it error to let the jury pass on this evidence,29 but
the majority refused to set aside the verdict.
Perhaps the most important West Virginia case on this question
is the very recent decision of Pygman v. Helton." In attempting
to establish a causal connection between his injury and a subsequent hernia, the plaintiff relied on three sources of evidence: his
own testimony of freedom from pain prior to the accident, the testimony of the doctor who examined him before the injury and found
no hernia, and the testimony of the surgeon who opeated on him.
The surgeon testified, "[lit was possible. It could cause it. It is
possible."3 ' On cross-examination, he admitted that one might
get this type of hernia merely by bending over, and that many
hernias result in the absence of accidents. He further stated that
he could not tell with either "absolute" or even "reasonable" certainty that the accident caused the hernia. For this reason the
trial court excluded the surgeon's testimony. 2 In reversing this
decision, the supreme court noted that reasonable certainty was
required to establish future pain and suffering, but not for establishing proximate cause. 3 Although the expert here said "possible"
and the expert in Foose said "probable" the court stated that "evidence relating to the cause of the hernia in the case at bar was as
competent and sufficient to show the causal connection between
the collision and the hernia as was the evidence offered to establish
27
136 W. Va. 1, 66 S.E.2d 545 (1951).
28

Id. at 6, 66 S.E.2d at 548. This is exactly what Foose stated; however,
the court there specifically said that the witnesses were testifying as to the
probable effects of the accident, and the experts even used the word "probable" in their testimony. In contrast in Evans, not only was the hypothetical
question based on a hotly disputed, unprovable fact, but the expert's answer
was that it would be "unusual" to cause that result but it "could have done
so." Thus the court has relied on a statement in a case standing for
probability as authority for its upholding a jury verdict based on evidence of
possbility
ossi29 I. at 23, 66 S.E.2d at 557.
148 W. Va. 281, 134 S.E.2d 717 (1964).
3,Id. at 285, 134 S.E.2d at 720.
30

32 1d.
33

Id. at 286, 134 S.E.2d at 721.
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the cause of a hernia" in Foose." Finally the court said, "[T]he
medical testimony of the surgeon does not stand alone but is supported by other evidence relating to the condition before the collision and the prior absence of a hernia." 5 Thus the West Virginia
Supreme Court held that expert testimony stating there was a
possibility of causation supported by other evidence could be
sufficient to establish a causal relationship.
In considering the quantity and quality of expert medical testimony necessary to establish a causal relation, the courts have taken
various paths. Probability is accepted by all and required by some,
although there are different standards by which it is constituted.
Testimony of mere possibility alone is not sufficient, but, when
coupled with other evidence, it is sometimes enough to take the
question of causation to the jury. This other evidence requirement
is generally satisfied by a factual sequence of events in support of
the possibility testimony of the expert. Earlier the West Virginia
court seems to have required probability as a basis for establishing
the causal relationship. The more recent decisions of State v. Evans
and Pygman v. Helton seem to dictate that West Virginia is following the line of cases which permit causal relationship to be
established by the expert's possibility testimony when supported
by other evidence.
Linda L. Hupp

Insurance-Recovery of Excess Judgment from
Insurance Company
X obtained a judgment against P, plaintiff, in excess of P's
liability policy limits. P sued D, his insurer, to recover the excess
alleging that D had exercised "bad faith" in failing to settle the
claim within the policy limits. The trial court allowed recovery of
the excess. Held, reversed. In holding that the evidence did not
support the verdict for P,the court stated that, as a matter of law,
D was guilty of neither negligence nor bad faith in not settling
with the injured party. Speicher v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insrance Company, 151 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1966).
3

287, 134 S.E.2d at 721.
Id. at 288, 134 S.E.2d at 722. Here the court cited with approval
Hamlin v. N.H. Bragg & Sons, 129 Me. 165, 151 A. 197 (1933) listing the
4 Id. at

3-

factual sequence of iat case, and thus endorsing the possibility-plus doctrine.
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